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ABSTRACT
Objective: To better understand the origins,
manifestations and current policy responses to patient–
physician mistrust in China.
Design: Qualitative study using in-depth interviews
focused on personal experiences of patient–physician
mistrust and trust.
Setting: Guangdong Province, China.
Participants: One hundred and sixty patients, patient
family members, physicians, nurses and hospital
administrators at seven hospitals varying in type,
geography and stages of achieving goals of health
reform. These interviews included purposive selection
of individuals who had experienced both trustful and
mistrustful patient–physician relationships.
Results: One of the most prominent forces driving
patient–physician mistrust was a patient perception of
injustice within the medical sphere, related to profit
mongering, knowledge imbalances and physician
conflicts of interest. Individual physicians, departments
and hospitals were explicitly incentivised to generate
revenue without evaluation of caregiving. Physicians
did not receive training in negotiating medical disputes
or humanistic principles that underpin caregiving.
Patient–physician mistrust precipitated medical
disputes leading to the following outcomes: non-
resolution with patient resentment towards physicians;
violent resolution such as physical and verbal attacks
against physicians; and non-violent resolution such as
hospital-mediated dispute resolution. Policy responses
to violence included increased hospital security forces,
which inadvertently fuelled mistrust. Instead of
encouraging communication that facilitated resolution,
medical disputes sometimes ignited a vicious cycle
leading to mob violence. However, patient–physician
interactions at one hospital that has implemented a
primary care model embodying health reform goals
showed improved patient–physician trust.
Conclusions: The blind pursuit of financial profits at a
systems level has eroded patient–physician trust in
China. Restructuring incentives, reforming medical
education and promoting caregiving are pathways
towards restoring trust. Assessing and valuing the
quality of caregiving is essential for transitioning away
from entrenched profit-focused models. Moral, in
addition to regulatory and legal, responses are urgently
needed to restore trust.
INTRODUCTION
A seeker of wisdom asked Confucius about
the essential elements of governing a state.
Confucius replied, “It is to provide food,
protect people with weapons, and gain trust
from people.” The seeker asked further
which should be abandoned ﬁrst if the state
is forced to choose between foregoing food,
weapons or trust. Confucius advised to
abandon weapons ﬁrst, then food. However,
he advised never to abandon trust. He
explained, “Trust is more important than life
itself.” This story suggests that trust is import-
ant within Chinese social relationships.
Patient–physician trust is an implicit, fun-
damental building block of clinical medicine.
A physician’s trust of his patients and a
patient’s trust of his physician are inherently
related, and both are crucial for healthcare
partnerships. Reciprocal trust establishes a
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Our qualitative data were collected from a range
of hospital types, locations and stages of achiev-
ing the goals of health reform.
▪ One of the most prominent forces driving
patient–physician mistrust was a patient percep-
tion of injustice within hospitals.
▪ Individual physicians, departments and hospitals
were explicitly incentivised to generate revenue.
▪ Patient–physician interactions at one hospital
that has implemented a primary care model
embodying health reform goals showed
improved patient–physician trust.
▪ Further research and policy attention are needed
to improve patient–physician trust.
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moral dimension to healing that is related to, but also
distinct from, the biomedical aspects of eradicating
disease. However, the local moral worlds within Chinese
hospitals are now fraught with tension and the growing
friction between patients and physicians has resulted in
verbal abuse, threats and physical assault.1 Medical
mobs, called yinao, regularly protest at hospitals or
harass hospital administrators in exchange for money.2
In 2011, a 10 province survey in China found that over
half of the physicians had been verbally abused,
one-third had been threatened and 3.4% had been phys-
ically assaulted by patients in the past 12 months.3 The
level of violence observed in China is more common
compared with violence against medical professionals in
other countries.2
Responding to the worsening patient–physician mis-
trust, national Chinese government leaders have identi-
ﬁed this mistrust as a major problem.4 Policy responses
to date have focused on adding security staff to hospitals
and outlawing hongbao (red packets given as gifts) and
related stopgap measures.5 Although several individuals
have sounded calls to action,1 2 6 current understanding
is based on limited empirical data.7 Deeper investiga-
tions that examine the origins, manifestations and policy
responses to patient–physician mistrust are needed. We
undertook this qualitative research to better understand
patient–physician mistrust and to create an evidence-
based foundation for restoring trust.
METHODS
Our study was implemented at seven hospitals (table 1)
in Guangdong Province, a province that recorded
25 000 medical disputes in 2013.8 Further data on the
nature of these medical disputes and how this province
compares with other provinces are not published. This
province was chosen because of the diversity of ﬁeld
sites (Western and Traditional Chinese Medicine, urban
and rural, and various stages of achieving health reform
goals) and access to hospital leaders. Goals of ongoing
Chinese health reform focus on improving the primary
care delivery system, piloting hospital reform, improving
access to healthcare and public health services, and
establishing a national essential medicines system.9 The
hospital that most closely achieved the core principles of
health reform had ﬂat fees (inclusive of diagnostics and
7 days of medication), strict policies prohibiting gifts of
any kind from pharmaceutical representatives or
patients, and higher physician salaries. These incentive
changes were possible because of substantial support
from the local government and hospital administrators
from Hong Kong University.
The research included participant observation and
in-depth interviews with patients, patient families, physi-
cians, nurses and hospital administrators. Participant
observation was overt within clinical settings. One
researcher spent evenings in the hospital and stayed
overnight in order to facilitate frank discussions.
Participant observations were recorded and used as for-
mative data to revise the in-depth interview guide.
Hospital administrators included a range of leaders dir-
ectly responsible for creating or monitoring hospital pol-
icies related to patient–physician disputes. Although
violence has been reported against nurses and other
health professionals, we focused on patient–physician
relationships because physicians have greater power
within hospital systems to mobilise change. We purpos-
ively sampled participants to include younger and older
physicians, inpatient and outpatient experiences, and a
broad range of patient–physician relationships.
Purposive sampling domains were qualitatively assessed.
Our goal was to identify patient–physician relationships
that were mistrustful as well as relationships that were
trustful. The interview guide was developed on the basis
of ﬁve key informant interviews with hospital administra-
tors, observations recorded from participant observa-
tions at each hospital, and a literature review of
qualitative patient–physician trust (see online supple-
mentary material). We continued to conduct interviews
until thematic saturation was reached at each site.
Data collection was conducted between June and
September 2013. First, hospital administrators were
approached by study staff about interviewing partici-
pants, and then individual physicians were contacted
through the medical affairs ofﬁce. Participant observa-
tion was conducted by the study staff to establish rapport
with physicians, nurses and patients. Some patients were
identiﬁed through physicians and others were identiﬁed
and contacted directly by the study staff after a period of
participant observation. In-depth interviews used a semi-
structured interview guide of open-ended questions.
Patients were asked to describe their current health
status and their interaction with the healthcare system,
including why they chose the hospital or doctor, their
feelings regarding that hospital or the care provided,
their interactions with physicians, and their thoughts
regarding their own patient–physician interactions in
China. Physicians and healthcare practitioners were
asked to describe their training, their daily work experi-
ence, positive and negative interactions with patients,
and thoughts about their medical career. Both patients
and physicians were asked speciﬁcally regarding medical
disputes, local media portrayal of doctors, security in
hospitals and healthcare costs. Administrators were
asked to describe their training and professional experi-
ence, their engagement with medical disputes, the hos-
pital ﬁnance and fee models, and their general thoughts
regarding patient–physician relationships in China.
Interviews were conducted in Chinese by an anthro-
pologist accompanied by a research assistant who took
notes. Participants were offered a small gift as an induce-
ment to participate. Each interview lasted 45–90 min.
When possible, interviews were conducted in private
spaces to protect the conﬁdentiality of interview partici-
pants. Interviewers obtained written informed consent
from all participants and interviews were audiotaped if
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participants provided consent. If participants declined
audio recording, written notes were used for analysis. All
audiotaped interviews were transcribed into Mandarin
and analysed. We used grounded theory10 informed by
Kleinman’s11 12 concept of local moral worlds to struc-
ture the analysis. By local moral worlds, we focused on
what was at stake for doctors in their clinical settings and
how that contrasted with what was at stake for patients
and families.12 These two theories were identiﬁed a
priori on the basis of their relevance to the moral
context of health in China. Previous research on
patient–physician relationships in China has not focused
on the moral dimensions. Coding was done in Chinese
using Atlas ti (V.7.0, Berlin, Germany). The coding
guide was developed by three individuals based on
examining 10 interviews. Emergent themes were identi-
ﬁed and expanded into sections on origins, manifesta-
tions and policy responses to patient–physician mistrust.
RESULTS
We interviewed 166 individuals about patient–physician
trust and mistrust (table 1). Our data highlighted some
of the origins, outcomes and policy responses to
Table 1 Overview of sampling at each hospital
Doctors Nurses Administrators Patients Family members Total
Hospital 1
Tertiary referral hospital;
General hospital
10 5 3 12 4 34
Hospital 2
Western running mechanism;
Hospital reform target site;
Tertiary referral hospital
11 4 4 11 4 34
Hospital 3
Tertiary referral hospital;
Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital
10 4 4 11 4 33
Hospital 4
County-level tertiary referral hospital;
General hospital
10 4 3 11 2 30
Hospital 5
County-level grade II level A hospital;
General hospital
9 4 4 10 2 29
Hospital 6
District-level urban hospital
3 0 3 0 0 3
Hospital 7
Integrated paediatric hospital
1 0 3 0 0 3
Total 54 21 24 55 16 166
Figure 1 Origins, outcomes and policy responses of patient–physician mistrust.
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patient–physician mistrust in China (ﬁgure 1). The
origins of patient–physician mistrust were rooted in
strong perceptions of injustice (table 2). Patients felt
that drug and overall medical costs were inﬂated and
clinical decisions about diagnostic tests and drug pre-
scriptions were skewed towards maximising revenue
instead of improving outcomes (table 2). One patient
remarked that “Now everything is guided by economics.
For physicians, hospital salaries can’t come close to
matching money from kickbacks and commissions.”
Patients and physicians described how patients with life-
threatening illnesses who presented to the emergency
department without sufﬁcient funds were refused critical
care. The essential motive of physicians to prioritise
healing patients was threatened by a wide range of non-
salary incentives, including the following: indirect
favours and all-expenses paid trips to tourist sites and
conferences; incentives from hospitals and clinical
departments to generate revenue; direct cash payments
from pharmaceutical companies based on the number
of branded drugs prescribed; favours, cash and gifts as
part of hongbao from patients. In the hospital context,
red packets are cash gifts given to physicians in an
attempt to assure high-quality care. However, patients
reported heightened expectations after giving red
packets that subsequently distorted relationships and
inferred that good health outcomes could be purchased.
These practices often contributed to unrealistically high
expectations from patients and their families that led to
disappointment after poor outcomes (table 2).
In addition to patients’ perceptions of unfairness,
physicians also reported injustices within the medical
system. Physicians noted intense workloads (eg, seeing
50 outpatients within a 4 h outpatient clinic shift) and
pressures from within the hospital to generate revenue
in the face of low salary, high patient expectations and
sensationalist reports from mass media (table 2).
Moreover, physicians reported inadequate training to
deal with patient disputes. The conventional medical
curriculum in China focused on biomedical didactics
rather than humanistic experiential training. Physicians
also noted that the training system resulted in a limited
number of subspecialised experts clustered in urban
tertiary care settings transiently evaluating a large
volume of patients rather than a larger number of
primary care doctors longitudinally caring for a smaller
volume of patients. Moral dimensions of medicine such
as caregiving, conﬂicts of interest, professionalism and
medical ethics were not included in medical training.
We deﬁne caregiving as providing cognitive, behav-
ioural, emotional and moral support. Technical bio-
medical competence was prioritised over caregiving and
Table 2 Quotations supporting origins of patient–physician mistrust
Theme Quotes
Perceptions of injustice driving patient–
physician mistrust
(1) “Now everything is guided by economics. For physicians, hospital salaries
can’t come close to matching money from kickbacks and commissions. Maybe
because his wallet grows, he is willing to engage in practices that violate his
own professional ethics so that he can increase his own profits.”—Patient
(2) “[To a physician, the patient’s] life is only worth several hundred yuan [tens
of GBP]. In China, a person’s life is just not worth that much. So as a physician
if you save things that do not have that much worth, then your income will be
low.”—Physician
(3) “You will find that when some patients see the doctor, they carry with them
an extremely distrustful, hostile, and negative tone of speaking. These patients
lay it out: newspapers are talking about the violence, hospitals are not to be
trusted, and doctors are the worst. If you see a hundred patients and only see
one distrustful patient, it matters. It slowly influences your perception of
patients.”—Physician
High expectations from patients (1) “The biggest problem is the information between patients and physicians is
asymmetric. Physicians have too much information and patients have too little.
And physicians’ information is very systematic, while patients’ information is
disorganized. This information inequality can cause many conflicts.”—
Physician
Physicians lack training in medical
communication and humanities
(1) “[Health professional education] It’s just taught according to the book line by
line, it’s very rigid and dogmatic. For example, patient-doctor communication
isn’t sufficient. Actually at the bedside we learn a lot of these kinds of
communication skills. But the kinds of communication skills we were taught in
school are not the kinds of skills we can apply.”—Nurse
(2) “Resolving the physical illness makes the patient feel satisfied. But if you’re
also able to deal with the psychological issues, it would make everyone better
off. There are some people whose medical skills you can’t deny but their
temperament and communication skills impede their work.”—Physician
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empathy for patients both in medical training and in
clinical practice.
Patient–physician mistrust led to anger enacted in
medical disputes resulting in three main outcomes—
non-resolution with patient resentment towards physi-
cians, violent resolution and non-violent resolution
(table 3, ﬁgure 2). Anger and perceptions of unfairness
were initially communicated to family and friends. Social
media and kinship networks then facilitated the organ-
isation of public protests at hospitals. Smaller protests
(fewer than 15 people) were organised by family
members of the patients. Larger protests (greater than
15 people) were organised by medical mobs. Violent
resolutions included verbal abuse, threats against
physicians and physical violence resulting in injuries and
deaths. Some patients successfully negotiated the hos-
pital system to broker an informal resolution and receive
a sum of money (ﬁgure 2). There was a strong reluc-
tance to use legal means to resolve medical disputes.
This reluctance was ascribed to the complexity of ﬁling
lawsuits and the relatively underdeveloped legal system
poorly equipped to respond (table 3).
Several policy responses to violence against physicians
emerged (table 4). Hospital security forces were
deployed at several hospitals with the intention of
making hospitals safer. However, security staff and
guards within hospitals made patients and their families
feel insecure and upset with hospital systems. Increased
Table 3 Quotations supporting manifestations of patient–physician mistrust
Theme Quotes
Non-resolution with residual patient
resentment towards hospitals
(1) “There are several reasons for this [resentment]. One is that in China taking
the legal route is too complex. Second, a patient considers fairness. He worries
about whether or not health institutions cover up for each other. Third, there are
certainly some people instigating it, including medical mobs at our hospital.
Every time it’s the same several people and some are professional medical
mobs. In China, a lawsuit is really inconvenient. It might be able to resolve the
problem, but the patient can’t necessarily wait that long. Finally, if the patient
goes and stirs up trouble and sees that the government again comes out and
helps him resolve the problem, he will feel that choosing this route is best, as a
result it encourages this practice.”—Physician
(2) “At the beginning he said that he wanted our associate dean to come out
and apologize to him. We gave the patient an explanation, but he continued to
make a fuss. The patient later made requests that made us not know whether to
laugh or cry. He said, ‘All I want is to have your director to kneel down and
apologize in public. That is all I want, nothing else.’ Then one of our colleagues
from the medical affairs department became angry and said, ‘If you say this
then there’s nothing we can do. We can’t go on discussing.”—Administrator
(3) “The physicians, nurses, no one was able to mediate between the upset
patient and the hospital. These people said they wanted to see the director.
They also organized a medical mob and held banners at the hospital. They said
the hospital treated human life as worthless. They made it so the doctor was
not able to continue seeing other patients because of the dispute. The patient’s
whole village came.”—Physician
Violent resolution of a medical dispute (1) “But I don’t know why they still have not taken the normal channel. Later
when the family members forced the hospital to pay the money, at once he (the
patient) climbed to the fourth floor and jumped.”—Nurse
Non-violent resolution through informal
mechanisms
(1) “[The patient affairs department] might go communicate with the patient and
give the patient a platform for communication because many patients today feel
that doctors are too remote. I file a complaint about you but you don’t fear
complaints. Actually patient affairs has this kind of function. If doctors and
nurses do not treat a patient well, this complaint is valuable. Then our hospital
would definitely give a warning to the relevant staff, the relevant doctors and
nurses, or even take disciplinary action or make a dismissal. This can definitely
happen.”—Physician
(2) “In our institution’s [hospital with a new primary care model] guidelines we
strictly prohibit physicians from accepting red packets and money from
pharmaceutical representatives. And our appointment system schedule has to a
certain extent helped mitigate conflicts.”—Physician
(3) “Here [hospital with a new primary care model] it’s organizational reform. We
are putting more emphasis on patient satisfaction, encouraging a patient service
mentality, aligning more with international standards, so we are demanding
more and more from ourselves.”—Physician
Tucker JD, et al. BMJ Open 2015;5:e008221. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2015-008221 5
Open Access
media attention on medical disputes also reinforced mis-
trust (table 4). Greater security staff more strictly
enforced family visit restrictions in hospitals, worsening
patient medical experience. This led to a vicious cycle
with the unintended consequence of worsening mistrust
(ﬁgure 3). Several hospitals also piloted “patient sugges-
tion boxes”, more formalised dispute resolution within
medical affairs departments, and related measures to
address disputes.
Non-violent dispute resolutions were more common
within a new model of primary care consistent with core
principles of health reform (table 4, ﬁgure 1). At
University of Hong Kong-Shenzhen Hospital
(HKU-SZH), doctors were expected to prescribe regi-
mens according to their ability and judgement, “keeping
oneself far from all intentional ill-doing and all seduc-
tion.” The hospital believed that healthcare is not a com-
modity and quality care requires investment. HKU-SZH
is a joint venture between University of Hong Kong and
the Shenzhen Municipal Government. Medical staff
were remunerated at a salary comparable to other pro-
fessionals of similar standing. Medical staff bonuses were
not linked to the income of individual departments.
The hospital has a strict zero tolerance policy on the
acceptance of bribes, favours and any other in-kind ben-
eﬁts. The health system was set up to optimise patient-
centred experiences and streamline the process of
receiving high-quality care from the perspective of
patients. Physicians have 15 min of protected time for
each initial appointment with patients. To make this
ﬁnancially viable, the registration fee to see a doctor is
100 renminbi (RMB) (£10.60 GBP) and this includes a
consultation and preliminary diagnostics. Seven days of
medication costs an additional 100 RMB (£10.60 GBP).
Patients within this system reported higher levels of
trust, in part because they were conﬁdent that physicians
did not receive any non-salary payments and were focused
on patient-centred care. In turn, physicians reported
greater levels of trust in their patients, as patients who were
willing to pay higher initial fees also had an understanding
for the motivations behind the ﬂat-fee payment model.
Administrators in this hospital noted that longer clinical
visit times, physician training and detailed evaluation,
transparent means of addressing patient complaints and
suggestions, and ﬂat fees for diagnostics and medications
contributed to patient–physician trust.
DISCUSSION
Our study found that patient perceptions of injustice
related to the costs of care and conﬂicts of interest, inad-
equate physician training and health systems factors con-
tributed to patient–physician mistrust (ﬁgure 1).
Patient–physician interactions at one hospital that has
implemented a primary care model embodying health
reform goals showed improved patient–physician trust.
The crisis of widening patient–physician mistrust in
China revealed through this empirical research extends
previous theoretical research.2 3 13 14 While patient–phys-
ician mistrust has been noted among minorities in the
USA,15 16 it has become a common part of the Chinese
patient experience. Although similar research in low
income countries is lacking,17 our ﬁndings are consist-
ent with research on patient–physician mistrust in
Pakistan18 and India.19
Our data suggest that patient perceptions of societal
injustice and the commercialisation of medicine play a
major role in the development of patient–physician mis-
trust in China. Hospitals systematically refuse care to poor
patients and ﬁnancially devastate families that have pro-
longed illness. Rudimentary health insurance schemes
alongside an underdeveloped legal infrastructure provide
few options for the sick who cannot afford health services.9
Focusing on ﬁnancial rather than humanistic aspects of
Figure 2 Schematic of pathways from patient–physician mistrust to outcomes of medical disputes.
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Table 4 Quotations supporting policy responses to patient–physician mistrust
Theme Quotes
Increased hospital security forces inadvertently
precipitate mistrust
(1) “I don’t really like this feeling of having the security guards making
inspections. I understand why the hospitals are doing this now,
they’re worried about patients stirring up trouble. But the security
guards are walking back and forth, and sometimes when I take a
walk in the hallway I run into them. I have the feeling of a prisoner
being let out to exercise. This makes me feel very uncomfortable. I
feel like I am not free and I’m being watched.”—Patient
Increased media attention reinforces mistrust between
physicians and patients
(1) “If reported incorrectly, media portrayals of medical disputes
tarnish the image of physicians. Increasingly the media holds
responsibility for conflicts between physicians and patients. Of
course, many common people don’t really understand, and then
the media exaggerates to make it look more serious. For example,
expectations about the cost and ability to cure an illness should be
reasonable. They can’t be too high. I think the media should
disseminate medical knowledge. When a dispute occurs, the
media should report it objectively. Before reporting, they should
interview physicians, understand the situation a little. Sometimes
the media reports are inaccurate and its clear the media doesn’t
understand medicine.”—Physician
(2) “Some [media stories] are true, but some are taken out of context.
The media goes and amplifies one point of view. Because the media
always wants to find a flashpoint, a highlight, to attract people to read
or watch the report. There certainly is this kind of news report, but you
need to look at whether the perspective is balanced. The way the
media reports many things is not from a balanced perspective. One
reason is that they don’t have this kind of specialized knowledge, and
second, I think they write with a certain aim. Some media stories are
real, but some media really carries its own purpose. When the media
provokes negative emotions in the public, it is difficult to control.
Reading about so many terrible incidents, if you see something, you
will think there is a problem.”—Patient
(3) “They [patients] often see too many negative news. Basically
every day the news on TV always has something about medical
treatment scandals, about this type of thing, or else it’s a dispute
between a patient and doctor. Many people just take the side of the
media. After an exposé, the common people just think that many
[doctors or hospitals] are not trustworthy.”—Physician
A hospital using a new primary care model has started
the process of gradually restoring patient–physician trust
(1) “I think general practitioners can completely solve this problem
[of patients crowding large hospitals]. If these things [minor
medical issues] are given to general practitioners to handle, then
patients won’t need to crowd the large hospitals, then the large
hospitals probably won’t have to call on the big physicians in each
specialty so much, and they will have more time and energy to do
more specialized [cases]. I think general practitioners ought to
have an even greater function.”—Physician
(2) “It’s not that I will just prescribe whatever medication you want me
to prescribe, rather I will prescribe whatever medication your
condition requires…I don’t need to order so many diagnostic tests.
Second, pharmaceutical misuse is a big part of it. Third, prescribing
medications and ordering diagnostic tests affects the cost problem. If
I reduce the patient’s expenses, he is also very satisfied.”—
Physician
(3) “Compared to other hospitals in China, the salaries for physicians
at this hospital [the primary care model] are quite good, even
considering that doctors in some of the large hospitals receive
money under the table [red packets or payments from
pharmaceutical representatives]. Altogether the salary here has
been carefully thought through [by the administration], it’s a dignified
salary. The salary structure incentivises quality performance.”—
Physician
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medicine has eroded patient–physician trust in the
USA,20–22 the UK23 and other settings.17 However, Chinese
physicians are directly and indirectly paid by
non-employers to a far greater extent than physicians in
other countries.9 24 Limited government ﬁnancial support
to hospitals (often less than 15% of the overall budget)
alongside low physician salaries encourage these structural
distortions.25 The Commission on Health and Family
Planning in China announced that it would ban all red
packets given to physicians,26 but broader health systems
innovations are needed to fundamentally realign
incentives.
We found that physician training lacked core humanis-
tic components that nurture empathy and caregiving.
The rituals, curriculum and relationships of medical
training shape physician values and professionalism.27 28
Additional preclinical and clinical training could equip
junior physicians with the skills required to address dis-
putes with patients, including negotiating and reporting
disputes, navigating conﬂicts of interest, applying princi-
ples of medical ethics, empathising with patients and
families and apologising for errors.29 Outside of China,
results from humanistic medical education initiatives
suggest that nurturing these components promotes
patient–physician trust.30
We found that interactions at the hospital implement-
ing health reform goals improved patient–physician
trust. Although these models are relatively new, they
suggest that restructuring incentives at the hospital level
may help restore patient–physician trust. This ﬁnding is
consistent with other research in China showing that
health reform pilots have been associated with higher
levels of patient and physician satisfaction31 but contra-
dicts ecological data suggesting a link between health
reform and increased violence at Chinese hospitals.32 33
These ecological data would not account for the rela-
tively high level of violence against physicians observed
in many urban hospital settings in which health reform
has been incomplete or slow. Our data provide further
empirical evidence that accelerating health reform
implementation may promote patient–physician trust.
While we focused on patient–physician mistrust, interper-
sonal mistrust in China extends beyond the medical sphere
and has been observed in a wide range of other relation-
ships, including student–teacher,34 worker–employer35 and
citizen–leader.36 The recent infant milk powder contamin-
ant scandal37 reinforces such interpersonal mistrust
between the powerless and the powerful. However, a
broader analysis of interpersonal mistrust in China was
beyond the scope of this research.
Our research has several limitations. First, we limited
data collection to one Chinese province. However,
Guangdong is one of the largest provinces in China and
draws migrants from across the country. We also used a
purposive sampling strategy to ensure that hospitals in
various stages of health reform, geographies and clinical
contexts were captured. Further research in other pro-
vinces and regions is necessary to improve patient–phys-
ician trust in China. Second, our study was
cross-sectional and causal inferences should be viewed
with caution. Third, our investigation focused on refer-
ral centres in urban and semiurban settings, without
examining township-level health centres. Fourth, our
investigation was not focused on the underdeveloped
medical malpractice system in China.38 Gradual
advances in dispute resolution and the rule of law can
also help restore patient–physician trust. Finally, our
research is qualitative and not meant to be representa-
tive. The purpose of undertaking this qualitative
research was to obtain rich local descriptions of patient–
physician mistrust and trust in order to inform reform.
Recent policy reforms in China have focused on pre-
venting violence against physicians instead of restoring
patient–physician trust. Both President Xi Jinping and
the Health and Family Planning Commissioner Li Bin
explicitly mentioned violence against physicians during
the 2014 National People’s Congress,39 emphasising
strict punishment of offenders in accordance with
Chinese laws and regulations. Yet the moral crisis that
our study revealed in Chinese healthcare demands a
legal and regulatory response as well as a moral one.
The Chinese phrase “zhibiao bu zhiben” means treating
the symptoms and not the disease. Cracking down on
violence and enhancing security measures are unlikely
to fundamentally alter patient–physician mistrust and
may inadvertently undermine trust.
Our research suggests three policy actions to restore
patient–physician trust in China. First, hospital incen-
tives must be restructured and health reform accelerated
at the hospital level to emphasise that primary care is
essential. Physician ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest must be
directly acknowledged and reported in order to grad-
ually restore trust in physicians and the healthcare
system at large. Second, medical education would
beneﬁt from greater attention to the humanities, includ-
ing clinical training focused on patient–physician com-
munication, ethics, professionalism and dispute
resolution.40 Finally, caregiving must be formally and
informally nurtured. The sharp ﬁssures between patients
and physicians need to be broached in their most basic
physical, emotional and cognitive terms. Patients and
Figure 3 Vicious cycle of unintended consequences
resulting from mistrust and medical disputes.
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their families who have suffered at the hands of the
medical system must be willing to negotiate and seek
non-violent solutions. Physicians who have been involved
in such suffering must be willing to apologise to patient
families and accept reasonable consequences for
medical error. Meanwhile, physicians and hospital
administrators must step up to serve as moral agents in
order to rebuild patient-physician trust.
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